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Chapter Five 
Ecology and Political Theory 
 
Chapter 6 is concerned with explanatory social theory; this one is about the 
encounter of ecology with normative political theory. Radical greens claim that 
ecology constitutes a new perspective in political theory which leaves behind the 
older longstanding traditions. They argue that there is a green view of society and 
politics and that specific social and political arrangements can be argued for on green 
grounds. Just as there are conservative, liberal and socialist political theories and 
forms of social and political organization, so there is a green political theory and 
green forms of social and political organization. 
 
The main issue in the encounter of ecology with political theory is whether ecology 
does undermine traditional political theories and constitutes a new theory itself. In the 
light of the rise of ecology are traditional political theories put into question or how 
should they be altered? Does ecology constitute a new paradigm through which 
environmental, social and political issues can be answered on green grounds? These 
are important questions because they determine which theoretical perspectives can 
help with fundamental environmental, social and political concerns. There are two 
issues: (1) the implications of ecology for traditional political theory and (2) the 
possibility of a green political theory. 
 
1 Ecology as revolutionary for political theory. Ecologists do bring new insights to 
political theory. They bring in nature in two mould-breaking ways. First, they show 
that there are natural limits to social and political life. The latter has to be evaluated in 
terms of natural limits and not just on social desirability. Second, they argue that 
there is an intrinsic value in non-humans, who should be considered ill moral 
evaluations. These points require political theory to include natural limits and 
non-humans. They are revolutionary for political theory in the same way that the 
feminist insistence on including the personal in political thinking is, because they 
imply the need for bringing in previously excluded issues of concern. 
 
2 A green political theory? There are two main problems with the case that ecologists 
make for green political theory. First, it is true that some sorts of social and political 
arrangements are more conducive to ecological ends than others and so could be 
seen as green. However, these are fewer in number than many greens argue. 
Greens put down too broad a range of values as being green. Many of the values 
they propose - equality and diversity, for example - are not definitively green. 
Ecological stipulations do not necessarily imply egalitarian or pluralist arrangements. 
Some - decentralism and non-interference, for instance - are problematic on green 
grounds. Second, there are a wide range of problems -for example on justice, 
equality and liberty - which environmental criteria are not equipped to solve. On such 
issues older political theories are more helpful. 
 
In short, ecology does bring mould-breaking insights to political theory. But the 
capacity for ecology to support a political theory can be exaggerated. With radical 
greens I agree that ecology is revolutionary for political theory. Against them I do not 
think traditional political theory is redundant or that ecology can support a new 
political theory. Against sceptics, however, I think that some principles and social and 
political arrangements (e.g. centralized co-ordination and selective growth) are more 
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adequate on green grounds than others and that ecology can, therefore, support a 
limited range of political theory principles. Let me explain some of these points, 
looking at ecology in relation to traditions in political theory such as conservatism, 
liberalism, authoritarianism and fascism, socialism and feminism.  
 
Conservatism 
 
Conservatism is a political philosophy which is averse to progressive change, 
oriented to the preservation of institutions and values and committed to tradition and 
authority. It is concerned with conservation of the best of the past and of hierarchy 
and the status quo. It should not be confused with the politics of, say, the British 
Conservative Party which, as well as containing conservative strands, also contains 
strong elements of radical laissez-faire liberal politics. It should also not be equated 
with the right in general. While in the West conservatives are often right wing, 
conservatism in the former Soviet Union, for example, is a label attached to 
Communists, with right-wing free marketeers who espouse liberal economics seen as 
the radical progressives. 
 
Some greens urge humans to be more humble and accommodating before nature, 
adapting to its laws and rhythms and putting less emphasis on exercising control over 
their environment and manipulating it to their own advantage. They are often 
sceptical and critical of Enlightenment ideas about the capacity of human rationality 
and the commitment to progress and innovation. This gives ecology a distinctively 
conservative edge, emphasizing conservation and adaptation to the existing order 
rather than intervention and change. Many greens hark back to the golden days of a 
pre-industrial past and use organic metaphors in ways also typical of conservative 
thought. 
 
Naess (1989:ch. 1), for instance, argues that our ignorance about the long-term 
consequences of our actions for the ecosystem means that the burden of proof 
should rest with interventionists rather than ecologists. In the absence of convincing 
evidence that our encroachments on the environment are not likely to be detrimental 
we should opt for a conservative stance of non-interference, accommodation and 
restraint. Naess echoes the holist and non-interventionist sentiments and conclusions 
of others like Lovelock (1979) when he argues that the awesome complexity and 
ability of nature to achieve balance and optimal conditions for sustaining life are 
sufficiently beyond our comprehension - yet to our benefit - that we are better advised 
to adapt to it rather than disturb it. 
 
However, there is much in green thought which is distinctly radical and 
non-conservative (see Eckersley 1992:21-2 and Wells 1978). Many greens call for 
quite radical changes in economic priorities. political structures, social lifestyles and 
cultural value systems. There are also strong elements of democracy and 
egalitarianism in radical green thinking which are at odds with conservative 
emphases on authority and hierarchy. In addition, ecology brings new insights with its 
emphasis on natural limits and the moral standing of nonhumans. Ecology does have 
strong conservative elements. But there are ways in which ecology is opposed to 
many traditional conservative tenets and brings new issues and concerns to political 
theory that are not accounted for in conservatism. 
 
Liberalism 
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Liberalism is a political philosophy committed to the rights and liberty of the 
individual. It contrasts with socialism or conservatism which are seen by liberals as 
being too tied to ideas about the obligations of individuals to the collective and the 
state rather than their freedom from such institutions. As with conservatism, it should 
not be equated with the politics of Liberal parties which, while often embedded in the 
liberal tradition, are also wedded to interventionist social democratic values which go 
against the liberal grain. 
 
The inclusion of nature in the ethical community can be seen as an extension of 
liberalism in an ecological direction because it speaks in a typically liberal language 
of rights and obligations. What greens can say is that they are taking the liberal 
language of rights to its logical conclusions (see Callicott 1980 and Nash 1985 and 
1989). Rights have been extended from propertied men to slaves, the propertyless 
and women and through the legal, political and social spheres of society. It is the 
next logical step for them to be extended to future as well as present generations and 
to animals and other living and non-living organisms (animals, plants and maybe 
even rocks, stones and sand). Humans, by virtue of our relationship to nature in a 
wider community, have ethical obligations to it. Ecologists discuss their concerns with 
concepts and preoccupations of longstanding concern from liberal political theory. 
Influential classic liberals have, in fact, explicitly preached environmentalist virtues. 
John Stuart Mill (1979) was an early advocate of the stationary state economy and 
Jeremy Bentham (1960) of the extension of rights to animals as sentient beings. 
 
However, there is a lot in liberal political theory that runs counter to radical ecology. 
Individualism, the pursuit of private gain, limited government and market freedom are 
contradicted by radical ecology commitments to the resolution of environmental 
problems as a collective good and to intervention and restrictions on economic and 
personal freedoms to deal with them. Liberal political economy is seen to underpin 
the commitment to economic expansion and accumulation and to the identification of 
wealth and material advancement with progress and improvement. Furthermore, the 
commitment to institutions of liberal democracy does not seem to fit well with strands 
in radical ecology which stress either decentralized participatory democracy or 
centralized authoritarian survivalism.  
 
So while ecology could be seen as an extension of liberalism, there are other senses 
in which the two are contrary to one another. There are elements of liberalism in 
ecological political theory but ecology goes against liberalism as well as drawing on 
it. In this case ecology challenges traditional political theory. But, by drawing on it, it 
does not undermine it and shows that green political theory does not stand alone as 
a new political theory which breaks with the old traditions to support itself on 
environmental arguments alone.  
 
Authoritarianism and fascism 
 
Ecology is often seen as conflicting with liberalism where it requires coercive 
solutions to environmental problems. It not only goes against liberalism in attributing 
environmental problems to market freedom, and the pursuit of private gain but also in 
suggesting that liberal principles may need to be overridden to prevent environmental 
degradation and the loss of human freedoms in the future as a result of worsening 
natural necessities. Ecology is seen by many critics as an illiberal political theory 
which draws on authoritarian and even fascist doctrines.  
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Critics suggest that green demands require excessive restrictions on human 
freedom. Sustainability, according to greens, requires governments to impose stiff 
restrictions on levels of consumption, family size and individuals' freedom to pursue 
their preferred lifestyle. These sorts of restrictions strike at the heart of liberal 
concerns. They suggest centrally imposed, co-ordinated rationing and intrusions into 
the most private aspects of our lives. 
 
Writers like Heilbroner (1974), Ophuls (1977) and Hardin (1977) who propose 
centralized or coercive solutions fear genuinely for human survival. Fired by notions 
such as the Club of Rome's ,exponential growth' they feel a need for urgently 
effective solutions. Given conditions in which individuals are motivated by self-
interest and the maximization of private gain, strong centralized state action is 
needed to enforce behaviour necessary for common survival. Individuals are too 
self-interested to pursue this by themselves. Even if human nature is transformable, 
the requirement for immediate action does not allow us to wait. Radical action is 
needed in the meantime and, in the absence of individuals' willingness to take it, has 
to be enacted by the state. A more liberal scenario would be preferable but pressing 
necessities require immediate state action to ensure survival and protect human 
freedom from worse future impositions on it due to disintegrating ecological 
necessities.  
 
Some of the 'coercive' perspectives touch on arguments to do with population control 
and deal with distributions between developed and less developed countries and 
issues to do with immigration and race. It is in areas like this that coercive solutions 
are sometimes seen to be also fascist. Let me illustrate arguments put forward by 
some allegedly authoritarian or fascist environmentalists by looking at the proposals 
of ecologists like Hardin and others. 
 
Hardin expresses many of the themes to do with private self-interest and commonly 
agreed coercion now to avoid worse ecological impositions in the future. He looks at 
population control and distributions between developed and less developed 
countries. His allegory on the 'tragedy of the commons' is a classic in the ecological 
literature (Hardin 1977). 
 
Hardin argues that the 'tragedy of the commons' happens when herdsmen (sic) using 
common pasture decide individually to add animals to their herds to maximize their 
own gain. Each herdsman calculates that he will reap the full gains from grazing an 
extra animal because it will all be his but will be able to spread the consequences of 
the overgrazing caused by this because it affects property which is communal. On 
balance it is worth it for the individual. The tragedy is when all the herdsmen start to 
do the same thing and get locked into a spiral where each looks to their own 
individual interest and disregards the interests of society. The commons are, of 
course, subject to natural limits which do not allow them to carry the escalating level 
of use and they become overgrazed and eventually ruined because of the free 
pursuit of self-interest on common property. 'Freedom in a commons', Hardin argues, 
‘brings ruin to all' (1977:20) and this, of course, is an analogy for the planet-wide 
situation. This is where the population question comes in because Hardin argues that 
the commons are safe while the population of herdsmen and cattle are kept down by 
war, disease and so on. But it is when population growth begins to exceed the 
carrying capacity of the land that the problems start.  
 
Hardin's metaphor could be used to come to different political conclusions and is very 
relevant to whether liberal or socialist perspectives are more adequate to a green 
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perspective in political theory. From the left it could be a condemnation of private 
ownership, market freedom and self-interested economic rationality. If the herd as 
well as the land was owned commonly then the communal impact of overgrazing 
would receive greater attention. From the right it could be an argument for private 
ownership of the land as well the cattle so that private decisions would have a private 
rather than a common impact and people would be personally liable for their 
decisions. This would inhibit them from pursuing environmentally damaging practices 
if they were to bear the full brunt of its effects and would provide a self-interest 
motivation for protecting the environment. 
 
Hardin himself advocates various solutions - private property and pollution and 
population controls - which involve impinging on peoples' freedoms. Mutual coercion, 
mutually imposed, is how he envisages it. But Hardin argues that these restrictions 
prevent us from imposing common ruin on ourselves and safeguard our future 
freedom to pursue our goals. Furthermore, coercion rather than exhortation is 
necessary because appeals to act conscientiously do not recognize the self-interest 
maximizing orientation of individuals al their ability to remain stubbornly unshaken by 
common interests ill context where greatest value is placed on liberal individual 
freedoms.  
 
Hardin's argument is powerfully evocative and many greens are convinced of the 
need for some measure of coercion, if only to a degree comparable to the coercions 
in law we already accept and in pursuit of longer-term freedoms. This is not least the 
case on the question of population control that most concerns Hardin. Irvine and 
Ponton (1988:18-23), for example, argue that: 
 
Nature would eventually solve the problem of human 
numbers but in ways unacceptable to civilised thinking. 
The only alternative, therefore, is human self-restraint ... 
Freedom is divisible ... If we want to keep the rest of our 
freedoms, we must restrict the freedom to breed ... There 
could be payments for periods of non-pregnancy and 
non-birth ... tax benefits for families with fewer than two 
children; sterilisation bonuses; withdrawal of maternity 
and similar benefits after a second child; larger pensions 
for people with fewer than two children; free, easily 
available family planning; more funds for research into 
means of contraception, especially for men; an end to 
infertility research and treatment; a more realistic 
approach to abortion; the banning of surrogate 
motherhood and similar practices ... In terms of foreign 
aid, the cruel truth is that help given to regimes actually 
opposed to population policies is counter-productive and 
should cease. They are the true enemies of life and do 
not merit support. So too are those religions which do not 
actively support birth control. 
 
Proposals such as those for the ending of fertility research and surrogate motherhood 
raise an issue central to many environmental proposals but often overlooked: equality 
(for exceptions see J. Young (1989) and Jacobs (1991)). These proposals place the 
burden of population control disproportionately on one group: infertile women. Apart 
from this fact and the stridency of the final remarks quoted, though, what is most 
shocking and unsettling for many of us about what Irvine and Ponton advocate is in a 
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cruel illiberal irony. This is that to rescue one thing we categorize as 'nature' - the 
external environment - they propose manipulation of another activity we feel should 
be immune to interference because it is regarded as natural and private - having 
children. 
 
In another controversial allegory in which he proposes this time the 'lifeboat ethic', 
Hardin shows how environmentalism can be turned into authoritarian or fascist 
proposals. He conjures up a lifeboat carrying ten people on a sea full of others 
drowning. The boat only has supplies for the ten. Hardin argues that to let any extra 
people on board would lead to starvation and the death of them all because of 
insufficient supplies to go round. This is easily translated into arguments against food 
aid to the third world on the grounds that the earth cannot supply enough for 
everyone and that third world peoples will have to go without, not least because they 
are the ones supposedly responsible for 'overbreeding'. This is echoed in the quote 
from Irvine and Ponton above but is fiercely attacked by environmentalists like 
Trainer (1985) and Caldwell (1977). They argue that both environmental and third 
world problems have more to do with first world over-consumption than third world 
over-population. Either way it shows that environmentalist concerns with issues such 
as population growth and scarcity are easy prey for translation into the reinforcement 
of stereotypes and discrimination on the grounds of race (Pepper 1984: 204-14). 
 
Critiques of aid link in with solutions to population control proposed by some greens 
which draw on Gala-influenced ecological ideas about the self-balancing capacity of 
the earth to stabilize and provide the optimal conditions for life. Aid, it is argued, 
removes natural checks on population growth by improving health and mortality and 
fertility rates. A report by the Environmental Fund (which includes environmentalists 
like Paul Ehrlich and Garrett Hardin) argues that: 'Improving the nutrition of poor 
women increases their fertility ... simply sending food assistance to hungry nations, or 
even helping them grow more food isn't enough. It simply makes the problem worse' 
(Environmental Fund 1977, quoted in Pepper 1984:210). Similar Malthusian 
reasoning is expressed in the journal of the green group Earth First!: 'If radical 
environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human population back to sanity, 
it would probably be something like AIDS ... the possible benefits of this to the 
environment are staggering' (quoted in Dobson 1990:64). 
 
Hardin's views go on to advocacy of triage (criteria for selecting which third world 
countries should be eligible for aid and which not) and eugenics (improvement of the 
human species by encouraging breeding among its more intelligent members and 
sterilization of the unintelligent and irresponsible (Pepper 1984:211-12)). Such 
discussions are based on Hardin's arguments about ecological scarcity and 
over-population and it can be seen here how ecological thinking can have clear 
commonalities with fascist political theory. 
 
Other supposedly quite moderate liberal greens propose tight immigration restrictions 
to protect communities from population growth (Porritt 1986:191; Goldsmith 
1988:203). This is a recipe for parochial self-protection, implying that communities 
should separate themselves off to look after their own interests and leave others to it. 
It would be made worse in the autarkic self-sufficient communities advocated by 
many greens. Furthermore, it does not tackle the problem which is to do with overall 
population levels rather than their distribution between territories. Immigration 
controls do not solve the over-population problem but merely displace it onto 
someone else. They do not relate to over-population but provide a breeding ground 
for xenophobia and racism. 
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The emphasis of many greens on self-restraint, self-policing and re-education 
through the state or decentralized community, and the ultimate fallback of coercion 
and law should moral pressure fail, all smack of the totalitarian (see Goldsmith et al. 
1972:14). And there is in some ecological writing a 'romantic quasi-mystical 
sentimentality' (Pepper 1984:207) and a metaphysical spiritual power given to the 
wilderness and 'Mother Earth' (see Lovelock 1979). This is reminiscent of 
non-rational semi-religious notions of race and destiny in Nazi philosophy. Like 
fascists, many greens are preoccupied with organic and holistic notions, naturalness 
and the natural rightness of hierarchy and the survival of the fittest (Pepper 
1984:206). 
 
All of this is of concern to critics of fascism and authoritarianism. In considerations of 
population, immigration and the third world and in the concepts and rhetoric of some 
green thinking there are racist and fascist potentialities. In proposals for restrictions 
on population, consumption and lifestyle a significant loss of human freedom seems 
to be implied.  
 
Ophuls (1973, 1977) is a survivalist advocate of coercive solutions who tries to deal 
with liberal criticisms of such a position. He argues that some rights would have to be 
given up in a sustainable society, especially rights to use private property as capital. 
But he suggests that restrictions on such economic rights do not imply restrictions on 
political rights or liberal constitutionalism. Restraints on consumption and lifestyle can 
be self-imposed. In fact, it is the absence of greater ecological consciousness and 
lifestyles rather than its imposition which is likely to lead to tyranny. Escalating 
resource depletion. population growth and pollution will, in line with the expectations 
of the limits to growth thesis, necessitate eventual recourse to even greater 
totalitarian and authoritarian measures by political authorities if these problems are 
left untouched by early action and are allowed to reach crisis point. Alternatively, 
nature will exert its own tyranny when extreme lack of resources and pollution place 
restrictions on human lifestyles. The choice is not between restrictions on one hand 
or freedom on the other. It is between freedom of lifestyle now or freedom from 
external necessity in the future and between restrictions imposed by political choice 
in the present or involuntarily later. Ophuls also argues that the decentralized 
self-reliant local communities envisaged by greens would involve less centralized 
power and intervention rather than more. Furthermore, greens tend to favour a 
freedom of local communities to adopt whatever social and political systems they 
prefer, with a resulting free diversity of forms rather than their imposition from above. 
 
Some of Ophuls's arguments are powerful, particularly that failure voluntarily to 
change our own behaviour now stores up the possibility of greater authoritarian 
action in the future. But his hopes for self-imposed changes are optimistic and 
understate the degree of centrally imposed restrictions that are necessary. 
Furthermore, small-scale autarkic local communities can be authoritarian in the 
degree of close community control they are able to impose, whether through coercion 
or simply the pressure of social norms. Larger, less easily monitored and controlled 
communities can be less effective in this respect. And a liberal tolerance of diverse 
forms of political organization in different communities may be illiberal because of the 
authoritarian regimes it could allow to exist. 
 
So the strength of Ophuls's arguments is mixed. But the key point is that centrally 
imposed curtailments on peoples' freedoms now are likely to be less authoritarian 
than those that would be required at a later stage and so can obviate more 
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authoritarian solutions in the future. Impositions on our freedom to pursue the lifestyle 
of our choice now will be nothing compared to threats to our ways of living, health 
and even survival if we do not make them. Greens can argue that restrictions on our 
freedom to pursue whatever lifestyle we choose are inevitable and that if we do not 
impose them politically ourselves they will be imposed in a more ferocious manner by 
nature. Libertarians are sensitive to the oppression of the state but at the expense of 
a sensitivity to possible threats to freedom from non-state sources (such as economic 
power or ecological necessity) and to the capacity of state to be a friend as well as 
sometimes an enemy of freedom (in this case intervening to pre-empt environmental 
crises). They are also reluctant to consider that restrictions cannot only be mutually 
imposed but also mutually agreed through normal channels of democratic 
accountability. State action can be combined with liberal and democratic institutions.  
 
So environmentalist concern can involve appeals to authoritarian or fascist ideas. On 
authoritarianism, however, many environmentalist proposals do not involve a 
qualitative shift from democratically agreed coercions we already agree to accept 
mutually in liberal societies. Furthermore, coercive action now is intended to pre-empt 
greater restrictions on freedom in the future whether imposed by political authority or 
natural necessity. Mutual impositions can also be subject to mutual agreement 
through normal channels of democratic accountability and liberal restraints. On 
fascism, environmentalist ideas can be compared in some cases to elements in 
fascist ideology. However, fascism is possible in, rather than necessary to, 
environmentalism. Many values in environmentalist thinking - the valuing of diversity 
and equality of species, for example - also go against the sort of totalitarian and racist 
aspirations of fascist ideology. 
 
Marxism and socialism 
 
Many ecologists argue that ecology is neither right nor left. Capitalism and socialism 
are seen as equally unecological because both accept the logic of industrial growth. 
Green thinking rejects that logic and goes beyond both. Porritt and Winner 
(1988:256), for instance, say, that there is a 'super-ideology' which unites capitalism 
and socialism in a common pursuit of economic and industrial growth (see also Porritt 
1986:44). Socialists as much as capitalists, it is argued, are committed to growth and 
the development of productive forces. Ecological problems in Eastern bloc state 
socialism have been worse than in Western capitalism, Chernobyl being the most 
prominent instance. Western parliamentary socialism on the other hand has 
envisaged growth as creating the wealth needed to finance the relief of poverty, 
egalitarian distribution and the welfare state. 
 
However, there are questions on which ecology does not break so decisively with 
socialism. Socialists have been keen to reinvigorate their own embattled ideology by 
aligning it with ecology whose fortunes are seen to be more on the rise than on the 
wane. But the reason for seeing some common ground between ecology and 
socialism cannot be reduced just to socialist expediency. 
 
Socialist writers have attempted to explore the relationship between socialism and 
ecology with varying degrees of receptivity or hostility to green thinking. I will look in 
this section at the relation of ecology to Marxist and socialist perspectives in political 
theory. Does ecology challenge such perspectives or require them to be adapted? 
How much can it draw on them to further its own analysis? Does it completely 
undermine them and establish itself as a new and distinctive doctrine which can 
break with traditional political perspectives? 
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I will look first at positive things which could be said about Marxism and socialism in 
relation to ecology before turning, in a fourth section, to a more critical assessment of 
their adequacy on environmental grounds. There are three main ways in which 
Marxism and socialism could be looked at positively in relation to ecological thought. 
(1) Marx had interesting things to say about the relations between humans and 
nature which could be useful to a green political theory. (2) Socialist political 
economy is a useful contributor to the analysis of capitalist and market structures that 
contribute to environmental problems and of institutions of socialist economic 
organization that could facilitate their resolution. (3) There is a decentralized 
communitarian tradition in non-Marxist socialist thought which is comparable to some 
strands in radical ecological thinking. 
 
1 Marx on humans and human nature A number of writers suggest that there are 
elements in the social theory of the early Marx which contribute to green political 
theory and an environmental theorization of the relations between society and nature. 
On this account, far from being undermined or surpassed by green political theory 
Marxism is a key contributor to it. 
 
Dickens (1992) and Lee (1980) argue that Marx has (1) a dialectical understanding of 
the relations between society and nature; (2) a notion of human realization which 
stresses relations with nature; and (3) an analysis of capitalism which criticizes 
peoples' alienation from nature. All this points to the beginnings of an ecological 
perspective in Marx which can be used in green political theory. 
 
Marx argues in his early writings that peoples' being is not simply psychologically 
internal but is constituted in their relationships with the wider social and natural world. 
People work on and transform their environments and the environment they are in 
affects what they become. More practically, people depend on nature for their 
material existence. Nature is 'man's inorganic body'. Marx felt that the powers and 
needs of humans, for intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic fulfillment, perception, 
interpretation, exploration and appropriation, are realized through interaction with 
their environment, social and natural. Without such interaction these powers are left 
unrealized or distorted. This is a dialectical conception which goes beyond un-
ecological frameworks in which humans and nature are divorced or opposites. Marx 
argues that among the forms of alienation suffered by people under capitalism one 
involves alienation from nature. Under capitalism nature is transformed into 
something 'other' to be exploited and valued for its utility and exchange value or as a 
property, possession or commodity. Overcoming alienation involves restoring our 
relationship to nature and rediscovering it as something of value in itself. 
 
All this sounds promising for ecological analysis. It gives a useful picture of peoples' 
interconnections with nature and an antidote to the idea that we can alter and 
transform it without this having implications for us. In the picture of human realization 
through interaction with nature there is a reason for humans to look after and protect 
the natural world. These observations suggest that, far from being made redundant 
by ecological political theory or transcended by it, Marx ism may provide a basis for a 
more ecological social and political theory. 
 
2 Socialist political economy. Socialist political economy suggests that environmental 
problems under capitalism are caused by its competitive and expansionary dynamic. 
Market rationality, the imperative to accumulate and the unbridled pursuit of profit 
produce externalities such as depletion and pollution. These do not matter in 
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capitalist calculations which are focused on what comes up on the balance sheet. In 
the effort to compete and accumulate, natural resource, are over-exploited and 
polluting side-effects created. Market rationiality is driven by short-term interests in 
profit which triumph over consideration of the consequences for resources or 
pollution in the distant future. Furthermore, environmental problems are not driven 
just by forces of production - industry and technology - but are also related to 
asymmetrical relations of production. Behind environmental problems are material 
interests and power relations. Capitalist owners are keen to pursue their material 
interests and, because they own the means of production, are dominant in power 
relations and able to do so. It is not just environmentally damaging technology which 
is at fault but also material interests in wealth accumulation and power structures 
deriving from ownership which allow technology to be used in pursuit of such ends. 
 
Socialist political economy suggests the need for the dilution of the profit motive and 
market rationality in economic decision-making in pursuit of broader and more 
long-term social and environmental objectives. Such a change requires a shift in 
relations of production in which at present those with a material interest in 
accumulation have disproportionate power deriving from ownership. Long-term 
co-ordination in the common interest, as opposed to competitive self-interest in 
pursuit of private gain, would require collective ownership.  
 
I argued in chapter 2 that states acting on behalf of the general interest through 
legislation and enforcement provide a more realistic prospect for environmental 
change than decentralization. 1 also argued that it is problematic to see market 
rationality or capitalist self-interests as coinciding with a general interest in 
environmental protection. Ecological imperatives imply the priority of general 
interests, intervention and planning over self-interests, laissez-faire and market 
capitalism. Such priorities find support in socialist political economy. My discussion in 
this chapter has also suggested that collective ownership of the means of production 
is more adequate to solving environmental problems than private capitalist 
ownership. 
 
3 Decentralist socialism. Socialism has, throughout its history, been a rich and 
diverse tradition but one in which its decentralist and liberal variants have been 
squashed by reformist statism in the form of social democracy in the West and 
revolutionary statism in Eastern bloc Marxism-Leninism. Decentralist versions of 
socialism, personified by writers like William Morris, G. D. H. Cole, J. S. Mill, 
Proudhon, Robert Owen and the French utopian socialists, have been the subject of 
rescue and revival attempts in recent times by liberal and pluralist socialists. The 
significant point is that the autarkic, decentralized, simple, self-sufficient commune 
envisaged by many greens (and discussed in chapters 2 and 7) is similar to that 
advocated by these socialists. What is more, some of them, Morris and Mill for 
example, were well aware of and concerned about environmental problems and the 
possible consequences for the environment of unsustainable forms of growth. Mill, 
ahead of his time also on socialism and feminism, even wrote, as I have mentioned, 
on the steady-state economy.  
 
So in Marx's theorization of nature, socialist political economy and decentralist 
socialism there is a grounding for ecological theory in socialist thought. There are 
questions of political values on which ecological imperatives do not specify an 
answer and this is another area in which traditional political theories like socialism 
remain relevant. Ecology by itself does not make a whole politics or social 
programme. Questions of justice and authority, for example, cannot always be 
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answered by environmental requirements. Ecology needs political theory as well as 
vice versa because 'we are social/political animals as well as denizens of an organic 
biosphere' (Ryle 1988:20). Ecological imperatives require some forms of social and 
political response but cannot alone determine them across the board, and structures 
of a sustainable society have to be judged in terms of traditional as well as ecological 
perspectives. This is another respect in which socialism might be required by green 
political theory rather than being made redundant by it. 
 
4 Ecological problems with socialism. Let me look now at the extent to which ecology 
challenges socialist theory or requires it to adapt. 1 have already discussed the 
merits and limitations of decentralization in chapter 2 and will return to them in 
chapter 7. There are two further problems 1 will focus on here: (1) the usefulness of 
Marx for a theory of the environment; (2) the incorporation of natural limits and 
non-humans into socialist thought. 
 
Marx's discussions of the environment are more ambivalent and complex than 
positive views of his ecological merits suggest. There are two problems: first, Marx's 
theory involves too heavy an emphasis on the human transformation of nature, and, 
second, it is concerned with humans at the expense of non-humans. 
 
On the first, nature is seen as a medium for labour. Humans appropriate nature 
through labour and technological advancement. Through the transformation of nature 
human essence is realized, The relationship between humans and nature is certainly 
dialectical and double-sided with nature playing its part in transforming humans. But 
part of the dialectical process is also the humanization of nature by people. Human 
freedom is seen in overcoming the constraints of nature. Marx's philosophy of history 
and social transformation and his theory of human nature recognize a dialectical 
relationship between humans and nature but one in which humans realize and 
transform themselves and their successive historical forms of social organization in 
the transformation and exploitation of nature through labour and the development of 
productive forces.  
 
Second, Marx's conceptualization of the human-nature relationship is based on 
human betterment and not the well-being of non-human entitles or of nature itself. 
The significance of the human-nature relationship is that it is through this relationship 
that humans realize their essence. The theorization of nature as our inorganic body is 
not set up to provide a basis for care for nature but to show how transformation of it is 
part of the furtherance of human development. There is nothing here about the 
betterment or well-being of nonhuman entitles. In fact animal activities are 
downgraded to being lowly or basic compared to human activities which are higher 
and more lofty and sophisticated. Common sentient being as a basis for comparing 
ethical treatment is not even considered. 
 
The usefulness of Marx's dialectical conception is compromised and complicated by 
the view of the transformation of nature given in it and its orientation to the 
betterment of humans to the exclusion of concern for non-humans. The 
contradictions with ecological concerns complicate the usefulness of Marx’s 
framework for a theory of environmental protection as much as they contribute to it. 
Given that the strength of Marx’s approach is in its dialectical framework it may be 
better to pursue such a framework through other sources or original work on 
dialectics rather than in the texts of the early Marx which are too complicated and 
contradictory on ecological concerns.  
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The second area in which socialist theory could be criticized on ecological grounds is 
for ignoring, first, natural limits and, second, obligations to the non-human world. The 
first of these does not stand up. Much socialist political economy is concerned with 
productivity, growth and the development of productive forces and their use to 
escape scarcity and create wealth in order to tackle poverty. It often focuses on 
restructuring relations of production leaving the commitment to developing the forces 
of production unquestioned. However, more and more socialists now question these 
assumptions. Growth and technological advance are seen to be subject to natural 
limits and susceptible to environmental side-effects. Socialist political economy is 
now often centrally concerned with the environmental externalities associated with 
market rationality and capitalist relations of production. Proposals for alternative 
forms of economy are based on adaptation to physical finitude and restraint in the 
development of productive forces and environmental exploitation. Eco-socialists 
recognize that a change in ownership of the means of production alone will not 
resolve environmental problems as these also require changes in the productivist 
outlook and restrictions on expansion in the forces of production. Many, furthermore, 
propose widening agency from the productivist industrial working class to social 
movements outside the labour movement.  
 
While socialists have shown a capacity to re-orient to concerns to do with natural 
limits and the problems of growth they have done so because of their anthropocentric 
concern for the well-being of humans. Socialists have been conscious of the 
implications of physical finitude and environmental externalities for humans. But they 
have been less concerned for non-humans and have drawn back from a genuinely 
environmental ethic. On 'the critique of the cornucopian and anthropocentric 
assumptions of modern political thought', Eckersley argues, eco-socialism 'has 
challenged the former but made no substantive inroads into the latter' (Eckersley 
1992:120). 
 
There is some truth in this but even here changes in eco-socialism are occurring. 
Benton (1993), for example, attempts a socialist theory of animal rights which goes 
beyond both cornucopian and anthropocentric assumptions but within a distinctively 
socialist perspective. Eco-socialism is sensitive to natural limits and weaker on 
obligations to non-humans. But on both it shows a capacity to revise its assumptions, 
even on the latter, where it has been slower, yet on which it can alter its conception 
of the relation of humans to animals on the basis of a socialist theory of equality and 
rights. Eckersley (1992:131) considers that while eco-socialism does not go beyond 
the human community this is not necessary to its outlook and can be remedied within 
a socialist framework. 
 
Let me summarize on socialism. While Marx is well worth returning to for a political 
economy of capitalism I am not convinced of his usefulness for the interpretation of 
environment-society relations. Otherwise, though, green political theory does not 
make socialism redundant. Socialism is challenged by the need to incorporate natural 
limits and non-humans into its political thinking and these are adaptations socialists 
can and are making. Green political theory can also take a lot from socialist political 
economy. Furthermore, socialism is necessary to resolve non-environmental 
problems to do with issues such as authority, freedom and justice. Socialism is, in 
short, reconstructing itself in the light of green challenges and is of use to ecology. 
Ecology does not render it redundant. In fact it may find in it a good basis for 
eco-socialist alliances, theoretical and political. 
 
Ecology and feminism 
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Another area in which ecologists are influenced by and find common areas of interest 
with traditions in political theory is in their relationship with feminism. In recent years 
some feminists have shifted from the main thrust of traditional feminism. They have 
moved away from an egalitarian and rights based emphasis on achieving equality in , 
man's world to a 'difference' concern with re-emphasizing the virtue, of the 
specifically feminine. For its advocates this means breaking with the terms of 
reference and undesirable values and characteristic. endemic in patriarchal 
institutions. To its critics it means returning to a celebration of all those submissive 
and privatized conceptions o femininity which have been at the very basis of 
women’s oppression. This difference of emphasis and direction has laid out 
preoccupations and concerns which have defined the studies of some ecological 
thinkers. Many ecologists have been drawn to the insight, and concepts of feminism 
in their analysis of the relationship between humankind and nature. 
 
Some eco-feminists argue that ecological sustainability requires placing greater value 
on balance and interrelationships, on biological and natural processes beyond 
human rationality and control and attitudes of caring, nurturing and humility. All of 
these correspond to personality traits and values traditionally associated with 
femininity. Eco-feminists conclude that women, or at least feminine values, have a 
special place in change towards greater ecological sustainability. Women are 
traditionally thought to have a greater sense of the worth of relationships and, as 
childbearers, to be closer to the rhythms of biological and natural processes. In their 
traditional domestic and maternal roles they are in day-to-day touch with tender, 
caring and nurturing concerns. Femininity is more conducive to ecological 
sustainability than the individualism, mechanistic instrumental rationality and 
dominating exploitative rationality of patriarchal masculinity. 
 
Many feminists reject this approach for the manner in which it reproduces 
stereotypes of traditional femininity which have been at the root of women's 
oppression. It ties women to the servicing and care of men and children, equates 
womanhood with a dangerous and mysterious biological emotional irrationality to be 
controlled and mastered, and it subordinates women to roles of humility and 
submissiveness. 
 
There are a couple of clarifications worth making about ecofeminism at this point, first 
on biology, second on men. First of all, eco-feminists do not necessarily seem to be 
saying that feminine values are biologically inherent to women and therefore fixed, 
immutable and confined to them. Femininity could be a socially constructed role 
which women are expected to live up to. In fact, that eco-feminists aspire to femininity 
becoming more generalized throughout the population as a whole suggests that they 
do not assume femininity is biologically determined and fixed. The biology and nature 
eco-feminists talk about is not the biology of genetic inheritance but of biological 
processes like childbearing, lactation, ovulation and menstruation. They do not 
generally endorse the psychology of genetically inherited personality traits or 
intelligence but are suggesting, rightly or wrongly, that by having special experience 
of childbearing women are closer to natural and biological processes of reproduction. 
This does not mean that men cannot have a 'feminine' sensibility but that the sexual 
division of labour combines with biological experience to make it more likely among 
women. 
 
The second clarification to make is that eco-feminists, for good or ill, are not generally 
separatist, anti-men or anti-masculinity. On separatism they propose not that 
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femininity should be expressed by women in a world of their own away from men but 
that the shared world of women and men should be more feminized. On men and 
masculinity, they seek a balance between masculinity and femininity in which men 
and women each share characteristics of both. They reject traits associated with 
masculinity such as aggressive individualism and domination but would find it difficult 
to reject the idea that women and men should not take from masculinity the values of 
being strong assertive and making demands. In the sense of both the clarifications I 
have mentioned eco-feminists appear to be different from some 'difference' feminists 
who sometimes have a biologist or separatist ring to their arguments. 
 
So eco-feminists argue that the 'feminine' stress on relationships and caring and 
women's closeness to biological and natural processes of childbearing and birth 
make them better equipped for the relational ecological sensitivity necessary for 
greater sustainability. The greater generalization of feminine traits and values among 
the entire population, female and male, can foster a more ecological society. 
 
Some eco-feminists argue, in a way that Bookchin (1980) does on hierarchy in 
human society in general, that there is a connection between the exploitation of 
women and the exploitation of nature. This may be because exploitative relationships 
in parallel spheres take place through similar hierarchical and dominating structures 
or, more strongly, because women and nature are actually connected in the same 
process of exploitation. On the weaker argument women and nature are simply both 
victims in different spheres of a society based on hierarchy and domination. More 
strongly, it can be argued that there is some greater connection in that structures of 
hierarchy and domination are sustained by the same patriarchal Enlightenment 
rationality which emphasizes 'masculine' values of mastery and rational control 
(Shiva 1988). Stronger still is the argument that women and nature share common 
characteristics or are constituted similarly in patriarchal myths and discourse (see 
Merchant 1990). Both nature and women are seen as having similar negative 
characteristics irrational, unpredictable, biological, mysterious and in need of control. 
Women and nature are not merely separate phenomena subordinate in parallel 
dualisms. They are subject to the same mechanistic patriarchal domination and 
constituted identically by it. Their exploitation is identical, and ecological and 
women's liberation are linked. This common identity of womanhood and nature could 
imply political alliances between the women's and green movements. Both, from this 
view, could benefit from the articulation of relational concerns and a greater value 
being placed on caring, nurturing and humility. 
 
I have argued that eco-feminism does not necessarily see femininity as biologically 
determined nor, for good or ill, is it separatist or anti-men. It does provide a corrective 
to the devaluation of feminine values and traditionally female activities in patriarchal 
and some feminist discourses. There are two problems in eco-feminist thinking I can 
mention here. The first concerns the problem of identifying feminine traits and the 
second the tactical advisability of focusing on revaluing femininity. 
 
A first criticism is that it is difficult to identify what feminine traits are when women 
often exhibit masculine traits and men feminine ones. To put it another way, it is 
difficult to find a consistent set of traits which women share and makes them distinct 
from men. The problem with this criticism goes back to the clarification made earlier 
on biology. It operates on the level of biological sex rather than social gender. 
Feminine personality traits are those socially associated with the social construction 
of femininity. They are not traits biologically inherent to women or that women always 
express and men do not. Feminine traits are not any less feminine if men sometimes 
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exhibit them. This merely demonstrates that men may sometimes be feminine, and 
the traits remain those socially associated with femininity and particularly expected of 
women. It is not that women exhibit consistent traits that make them feminine but that 
they are traits conventionally defined as feminine and expected of women. Most of us 
are fairly clear about what the core traits of femininity are on this understanding. 
 
There is a more tactical or strategic question which many feminists, with some 
justification, point to. This is that the activities and traits ecological and difference 
feminists seek to see more positively valued - care, nurturing, humility etc. - are those 
which have been at the root of women's oppression for centuries, confining women to 
servicing and subservient roles in the private sphere. Re-emphasizing such traits is 
likely to get us back to a situation from which feminists have spent a lot of time trying 
to extricate women. 
 
This is a strong criticism but there is an answer. Feminists can escape the 
reproduction of women's oppression yet still positively value feminine traits by 
focusing less on women's aptitude for them and more on the virtues of men 
expressing them. The focus can be on deconstructing masculinity and feminizing 
men rather than on women celebrating and expressing femininity. The latter strategy, 
pursued in a patriarchal society, is likely to reproduce and strengthen women's 
subordinate position. The former offers the possibility of promoting feminine values 
without merely reproducing women's confinement to traditional feminine roles. 
 
This does not preclude women celebrating feminine values or taking strength, 
assertiveness and self-worth from traditional masculinity. But it does imply a tactical 
shift of emphasis towards changing men which can avoid a return to female 
submissiveness. This engages with a stumbling block facing the women's movement. 
Problems in the past have often been based around mobilizing women into making 
demands and progress outside traditional feminine spheres. An increasing problem is 
men's refusal to be moved from their traditional masculine sphere towards more 
feminine values and into traditionally feminine areas of work, such as domestic work 
and childcare in the private sphere and traditionally female occupations and concerns 
in the public. Women seeking equality in paid employment or public involvement 
have found that they carry a double burden because they have to combine their 
public roles with continuing responsibilities in the domestic sphere. These are as 
great as before because of the lack of movement by men towards playing a role 
there. 
 
Whatever its difficulties, eco-feminism recognizes that traditionally feminine 
personality characteristics and activities have been devalued This has been to the 
detriment both of women who have performed their tasks too single-handedly and 
subject to low esteem and of men who have not helped or benefited from 'feminine' 
work (childcare in particular). Traditional egalitarian and rights-based feminism might 
have been an unwitting accomplice in devaluing desirable values and characteristics 
and rejecting potentially rewarding and fulfilling human activities as oppressive. 
Feminine values and activities, some feminists argue now, need to be more positively 
evaluated in future, for the benefit of women and men. Childcare and domestic work 
becomes impoverished when it is devalued and disproportionately loaded onto 
women. However, given more value and more equally shared, such tasks can be a 
source of fulfillment for women and men alike; similarly with feminine personality 
traits of tenderness caring, nurturing and concern for relationships. The absence of 
such traits from public life hinders ecological progress and the amelioration of conflict 
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and inequity. In private life their greater concentration on one side of the sex divide 
hinders liberation and fulfilment for both men and women. 
 
Feminism is another example of a tradition which ecology draws on rather than 
renders redundant. Ecology does not break off as a new paradigm with the ability to 
deal with environmental and social issues on green grounds alone. Just as it draws 
on ideas to do with obligations and rights from conservatism and liberalism and on 
socialist political economy, so feminist thinking is a resource for ecology rather than a 
tradition it transcends. 
 
Ecology: new political theory or no political theory? 
 
Andrew Dobson argues, when discussing O'Riordan's (1981:303-7) typology of 
global, centralized-authoritarian, authoritarian-commune and anarchist versions of 
environmentalism, that: 
 
‘not all of these presentations can accurately be described 
as corresponding to the political ideology of ecologism ... 
the closest approximation ... to the centre of gravity of a 
Green sustainable society is the last one: the so called 
'anarchist solution' . . . the Green sustainable society ... 
will not be reached by transnational global co-operation, it 
will not principally be organised through the institutions of 
the nation-state, and it is not authoritarian . . . it would 
therefore be quite wrong to see ecologism as an ideology 
(like nationalism?) that can be either right or left-wing ... its 
political prescriptions are fundamentally left-liberal, and if a 
text, a speech or an interview on the politics of the 
environment sounds different from that then it is not Green 
but something else’. (Dobson 1990:83-5) 
 
Ryle on the other hand argues that: 
 
‘'Ecology' . . . does not in itself determine in a positive 
sense the future development of social and economic 
reality. A society adapted to ecological constraints ... could 
take widely varying forms. This is ... implicit in the fact that 
very diverse 'sustainable societies' have been projected by 
different thinkers’.  
 One can imagine an authoritarian capitalist 
or post-capitalist society ... in which those at the top 
enjoyed ecologically profligate lifestyles ... protected by 
armed guards from the mass of the people, who would 
endure an impoverished and 'sustainable' material 
standard of living ... One can imagine a 'barrack socialism' 
in which an ecologically well-informed, bureaucratic elite 
directed the economy in accordance with environmental 
and resource constraints ... Ecological limits may limit 
political choices but they do not determine them. The 
green movement may attempt to assess every option 
against ecological criteria, and may claim that all its 
proposals are compatible with sustainability; but we should 
not make the mistake of thinking that no other proposals, 
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and no other outcomes, could be compatible. We should 
not assume that 'ecology' can satisfactorily define the new 
politics we are trying to develop. (Ryle 1988:7-8) 
 
Dobson is arguing that there can be a green political theory and that it is left-liberal 
anarchism. Ryle argues. however, that there cannot be a green political theory 
because ecological imperatives are open to different sorts of social and political 
arrangements. I would argue against Dobson that there cannot be a green political 
theory because while ecology implies some forms of social and political 
arrangements rather than others it also draws on older traditions to work out which 
are preferable on these grounds and to answer non-environmental questions to do 
with issues such as justice and liberty. Where different sorts of social and political 
arrangements are compatible with green objectives, traditional non-ecological criteria 
are needed to decide which are preferable. Ecology can be part of political theory but 
does not provide the basis for such a theory itself. 
 
However, ecology is not completely open. I have argued that interventionism and 
central co-ordination are implied by ecological imperatives rather than markets, 
capitalism or decentralization. Environmental demands do imply some sorts of social 
and political arrangements rather than others. Nevertheless, Ryle is right to say that 
many questions cannot be answered by ecology and, this being so, that a political 
theory cannot be constructed on green criteria alone. 
 
Traditional political theories are challenged by ecology. Ecology requires that they 
are adapted to take into account natural limits and non-humans. It has further 
implications for political theory in that some social and political arrangements are 
implied rather than others by environmental requirements. However, ecology cannot 
provide a new paradigm through which a political theory can be constructed on green 
grounds. Dealing with environmental issues involve, drawing on old conservative, 
liberal, socialist and feminist analyses. Furthermore, there are non-environmentalist 
issues to which green criteria do not determine answers and which have to be 
answered by these old traditions. Ecology has to combine with other perspectives to 
put together a theory and politics on preferable regimes of economic, social and 
political organization. 
 
Environmentalisms 
 
Before the next chapter let me summarize the different sorts of environmentalist 
argument I have identified. In chapters 1 and 2 I suggested that one issue on which 
different environmentalist argument can be identified is to do with solutions to 
environmental problems (see table 5. 1). 
 
 
Table 5.1 Solutions to environmental problems: technical or structural 
 
Type of environmentalism Solution 
technocratic environmentalist technical 
structural environmentalist structural 
 
Many greens propose technocratic solutions based on the development of 
environmentally friendly technologies. These might be ‘cleaner' or less polluting or 
can harness renewable (e.g. wind, solar power, tides) rather than non-renewable 
energy sources (e.g. coal, gas, oil). Other greens propose that underlying structural 
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factors to do with social value systems and lifestyles are the basic problem to which 
technical solutions cannot be found. Ecological degradation will continue until we halt 
growth and wind down consumption and population levels. 
 
In chapter 2 in particular I suggested another distinction within green arguments 
between those that rely strictly on environmental considerations for certain courses of 
action and those that rest their case also on independent social arguments for the 
intrinsic desirability of such courses (e.g. frugality, self-sufficiency) (see table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 The sustainable society: reasons for proposing it 
 
 
Type of environmentalism Arguments 
environmental environmental 
social environmental and social 
 
The latter category of arguments can lead to conclusions which coincide and support 
more specifically green arguments, but they are not themselves strictly green in 
content. I have suggested that environmental arguments should be distinguished 
from social arguments put forward by greens. Some green proposals (e.g. for lower 
levels of consumption and lower population levels) can be justified by recourse to 
environmental arguments alone. Others (e.g. the argument for decentralized 
self-sufficient communes) are not such clear-cut candidates for environmental 
justifications. Consequently green arguments for them rest more heavily on social 
arguments about intrinsic rewards and desirability which are not specifically green 
and should not be portrayed as such. 
 
In chapter 3 1 also distinguished between different green arguments on reasons why 
we should care about the environment (see table 5.3). Shallow ecologists argue for 
care for the environment on the grounds of its utility for human beings. In this sense it 
is humans and not the environment itself that they are really concerned about and 
this is what prompts some to regard people in this category as not really 
environmentalist at all. Deep ecologists argue that we should care about the 
environment because of its intrinsic value and entitlement to the same sorts of rights 
traditionally extended to human beings. These ecologists argue we should care 
about the environment for its own sake and irrespective of its usefulness for humans. 
Sentience advocates argue we should take special care to protect and respect all 
creatures who have the capacity to enjoy life and should also protect parts of the 
environment which have value for such creatures. 
 
Table 5.3 Environmental ethics: reasons for caring about the environment 
 
Type of 
environmentalism 
Reasons for caring 
Deep ecologist 
(eco-centric) 
Intrinsic value of all 
environmental entities 
Sentient ecologist 
(sentient-centric) 
Intrinsic value of sentient beings. 
Extrinsic value of non-sentient beings.  
Shallow ecologist 
(anthropocentric) 
Intrinsic value of humans. 
Extrinsic value of non-humans 
  
On the basis of sentient arguments such theorists extend obligations to animals as 
well as humans. On the basis of intrinsic value arguments deep ecologists extend 
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them to more of the environment: sentient and non-sentient living entitles (i.e. plants 
as well as animals) and in some cases non-living organisms as well (e.g. earth, water 
rocks etc.). How far the extension of rights goes depends on the characteristics 
according to which entities in the environment are seen to have intrinsic value. If 
merely being part of the community is what counts, then all things might be seen to 
have value and command respect. If capacity to flourish is what gives them intrinsic 
value then respect may extend to plants (and in differing quantities to different 
species of animal and plant according to their varying capacity to flourish) but not to 
non-living organisms like rocks. 
 
The arguments I have advanced through this book in relation these various 
distinctions are deeper than light-green proposals in that I reject technical fixes (while 
recognizing green technological advances as part of the solution) and purely 
human-centred concerns. However, they do not go as far as deep ecology. While 
they advocate structural change and non-anthropocentrism they extend the ethical 
remit to sentient creatures only, and not to non-sentient and non-living aspects of the 
natural environment on an intrinsic value basis. My arguments also go against green 
political theory. This is because I have argued that ecology can contribute to political 
theory but cannot make a political theory itself. It revolutionises traditional political 
theory by bringing in natural limits and non-humans but also needs it to help solve 
environmental problems and deal with non-environmental issues to do with social 
and political organization. In so far as green political theory does have definite 
political implications, I am not convinced that they are of the decentralized sort that 
many green political theorists propose. This chapter has dealt with the relation of 
ecology to traditions in normative political theory. Let me now turn to ecological 
concerns in explanatory social theory. 
 
Guide to further reading 
 
Robyn Eckersley's Environmentalism and Political Theory (1992) is a likeable and 
open-minded discussion of the ecological credentials of different political theories. 
Garrett Hardin's 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1977) is a classic and very 
important discussion which raises issues in liberal and socialist political philosophy in 
relation to ecological questions. Martin Ryle's brief and readable Ecology and 
Socialism (1988) is the best place to start an investigation of the relationship between 
the two traditions. A view by an influential figure on the new left is given in Raymond 
Williams's 'Socialism and Ecology' (1989) in his Resources of Hope. Joe Weston's 
collection Red and Green (1986) and Enzensburger's 'A Critique of Political Ecology' 
(1974) (in New Left Review 84 and his Dreamers of the Absolute) give traditional 
socialist views on the green movement. Rudolf Bahro's books Socialism and Survival 
(1982) and From Red to Green (1984) trace, as the title of the second suggests, the 
shift of one prominent writer from Marxism to the green movement. Peter Dickens 
(1992) in chapter 3 of Society and Nature and Ted Benton in chapter 2 of Natural 
Relations (1993) discuss the ecological credentials of the early Marx. The Ecologist 
22, 1, 1992 is a special issue on ecology and feminism which goes through many of 
the debates raised in the meeting of these two perspectives. Val Plumwood's 
'Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments' (1986) is a 
useful supplement to the Australian Journal of Philosophy 64. Dobson's The Green 
Reader (1991) includes extracts from an ecofeminist point of view by Shiva, Plant 
and Merchant which give a flavour of the perspective. 
